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ABSTRACT
AN ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT ABOUT POST-GREAT
MODERATION CENTRAL BANKING POLICIES
Kızıltan, Rabia Zeynep
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Selin Sayek Bo¨ke
September 2012
In this thesis, by focusing on the unconventional monetary policy mea-
sures, I have analytically assessed post-great moderation central banking
policies and documented the heterogeneity in calibration and design of these
policies by exposing the experiences of Japan, United States, United King-
dom and Brazil. Moreover, by estimating a structural vector autoregressive
(SVAR) model, I have empirically investigated the macroeconomic effects of
unconventional monetary policies. Empirical findings of this study suggest
that, unconventional monetary policies have lead a temporary increase in
GDP and CPI for United States and United Kingdom while its effects are
slightly significant for Japan and diametrically insignificant for Brazil.
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Unconventional Monetary Policy, Financial Cri-
sis, Central Banking
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O¨ZET
BU¨YU¨K ILIMLILIK SONRASI MERKEZ BANKACILIG˘I
POLI˙TI˙KALARININ ANALI˙TI˙K C¸O¨ZU¨MLEMESI˙
Kızıltan, Rabia Zeynep
Yu¨ksek Lisans, I˙ktisat Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Assoc. Prof. Selin Sayek Bo¨ke
Eylu¨l 2012
Bu tezde, geleneksel olmayan para politikası arac¸ları u¨zerine yog˘unlas¸ılarak
bu¨yu¨k ılımlılık do¨nemi sonrası merkez bankacılıg˘ı politikalarının analitik bir
analizi yapılmıs¸tır. Japonya, Brezilya, ABD ve I˙ngiltere merkez bankalarının
tecru¨beleri incelenerek so¨z konusu geleneksel olmayan para politikalarının
tasarlanmasında ve uygulanmasında u¨lkeler arası bir ayrıs¸ıklık tespit edilmis¸tir.
Bunun yanında, yapısal bir vekto¨r otoregresif model kullanılarak geleneksel
olmayan para politikası arac¸larının makroekonomik dinamikler u¨zerine etkisi
ampirik olarak sorgulanmıs¸tır. Ampirik bulgular gelenksel olmayan para poli-
tikalarının ABD ve I˙ngiltere’nin fiyat ve GSYH dinamikleri u¨zerinde gec¸ici
pozitif bir etkiye sahip oldug˘unu go¨stermis¸, ayrıca bu politikaların etkin-
liklerinin Japonya dinamikleri u¨zerinde ancak marjinal anlamlılık du¨zeyine
sahip oldug˘u, Brezilya ic¸in ise tamamen anlamsız oldug˘u sonucuna varmıs¸tır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Para Politikası, Geleneksel Olmayan Para Politikası, Fi-
nansal Kriz, Merkez Bankaclıg˘ı
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the financial crisis, implementation of monetary policy was quite
straightforward. In mid-1980’s, world have experienced a period with a rea-
sonable decline in output and inflation volatility. Kim and Nelson (1999),
McConell and Perez-Quinas (2000) and Blanchard and John Simon (2001)
have referred this period as “Great Moderation”. During this period, Cen-
tral banks have enjoyed a golden era until the recent financial crisis. Lower
volatility of inflation improved market functioning, made economic plan-
ning easier and reduced the resources devoted to hedging inflation risks
(Bernanke, 2004). With such a smooth economic environment, sustained
anti-inflationary monetary policies actually worked. During the Great mod-
eration, monetary policy implementation across countries had a consensus
where short term interest rate was the main policy stance. By the end of
Great Moderation, many central banks were formal inflation targeters while
many others behaved as inflation targeters despite they claimed they were
not. However, after financial crises conjuncture has dramatically changed.
Great moderation which has long expansions and short recessions has col-
lapsed with the crisis. Financial crisis acted as a negative aggregate demand
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shock which obligated central banks to adopt expansionary monetary poli-
cies. As a consequence of these policies, inflation forecasts and policy rates
are sharply reduced.
Figure 1a shows the policy rates for selected advanced countries between
the periods January 2006 - February 2012. As observed from the graph,
after September 2008, in almost all advanced countries central banks have
reduced policy rates up to zero point as a response to the negative aggregate
demand shock caused by the financial crisis. Similarly, in emerging countries,
in order to ease the monetary policy, short term interest rates were also re-
duced significantly. Figure 1b reports short term interest rate dynamics for
selected emerging countries. However, although emerging countries have also
reduced their policy rates, they did not face with the zero lower bound unlike
the advanced countries. This was an important milestone in the collapse of
the previous consensus on monetary policy, since from that date forward,
neither conventional monetary policy tools, i.e, short term policy rate was
an applicable instrument for all central banks nor stable and low inflation
was the primary mandate of all. Thus, over 20 Inflation Targeter countries
have started to pursue new approaches to overcome the negative effects of the
financial crisis by bearing in mind their own distinctive circumstances and
started to use unconventional monetary policies in order to obtain further
monetary stimulus.
When traditional monetary policy has reached its limits, advanced coun-
tries have injected outstanding amounts of liquidity to the economy in order
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to heal the financial sectors. As a result, the size of the balance sheets of
Federal Reserve and Bank of England has tripled while the size of the bal-
ance sheet of the Euro Area has doubled. Similarly, Swiss National Bank
and the Sweedish Riskbank have significantly expanded their balance sheets.
Bank of Japan has also increased the size of its balance sheet as a response to
the crisis. However, this increase remained limited until March 2011. After
March 2011, Bank of Japan started to increase its monetary base aggres-
sively. Figure 2 reports the monetary base accretions for selected countries.
While performing these policies, the main concerns that are needed to be
taken into consideration for advanced economies were the risk of falling into
a liquidity trap and being at the zero lower bound on interest rate. Because
if the nominal interest rates were initially low altogether with the actual and
expected inflation, policy rates cannot be reduced by central banks any fur-
ther. At this point, increasing the monetary base beyond the satiation point
of the economy becomes ineffective and liquidity trap occurs.
However, for emerging countries, liquidity trap and zero lower bound on
interest rates were not practical concerns. In fact, due to their stronger fi-
nancial systems, the starting points of interest rates and core inflation rates
were much higher than the advanced countries. Figure 3a shows the differ-
ence between the interest rates of emerging countries and advanced countries.
From the graph, we can see that emerging markets have adopted unconven-
tional monetary policies under much higher nominal interest rates in contrast
to the advanced economies which indicate emerging countries have higher
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growth rates and higher inflation. Figure 3b establishes the truth of this
statement. From Figure 3b, we observe that although both advanced and
emerging countries have experienced a reduction in their core inflation rates,
emerging countries did not go into a deflationary spiral since their core in-
flation level were initially higher.
In fact, the damnation of emerging market economies was completely dif-
ferent. Due to the shock, huge capital inflows to the emerging countries has
reversed and financing conditions has tightened while liquidity in domestic
money market and foreign exchange has reduced in magnitude. As a result,
emerging markets have experienced sharp depreciation in their currencies. In
order to provide liquidity in domestic money market and foreign exchange,
central banks started to adopt extensive liquidity provision policies. For ex-
ample, Brazil and Mexico have supplemented their foreign reserves by open-
ing a currency swap line with the FED. However, although they have widely
used liquidity provision policies by providing both domestic liquidity and
foreign exchange, they did not employ credit easing and quantitative easing
policies. Thus, the types of unconventional monetary policies adopted by
emerging countries remained much more limited.
Overall, post-crisis conjuncture of the central banking reveals that what
was acquired during the great moderation is lost now. Financial crisis has
unhooked central banks from the one policy, one mandate era and obligated
them to review their implementation frameworks and to experience new poli-
cies that they have not tried out before. As little is known about the nature
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and effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy tools, instrumentality of
utilizing them has become the focus of much heated controversies.
Against this background, in order to address this knowledge deficiency,
in this thesis I will try to analytically assess post-great moderation central
banking policies based on the experiences of US, UK, Japan and Brazil.
Following that, based on these four countries, I will examine the effects of
unconventional monetary policies on economic activity and prices by specif-
ically focusing on balance sheet policies.1
Outline of this thesis as follows: In Chapter 2, I will give a theoretical
framework for unconventional monetary policies with an emphasis on the
balance sheet policies. In Chapter 3, I will give the short history of mone-
tary policy implementation in US, UK, Japan and Brazil and document the
heterogeneity in design and calibration of balance sheet policies in these four
countries. In Chapter 4, by employing a structural vector autoregression
(SVAR) model, I will investigate the macroeconomic effects of unconven-
tional monetary policies based on the data of these four countries. Finally,
In Chapter 5, I conclude after some concluding remarks.
1Note that the term ”unconventional monetary policy” encompasses other types of
unconventional policies, such as conditional statements, which are not covered here.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNCONVETIONAL
MONETARY POLICIES
In this chapter, I will give a theoretical framework for unconventional
monetary policies. Along with the general usage of these policies, the main
focus will be on balance sheet policies. First, I will provide a general clas-
sification for unconventional monetary policies as given in the literature.
Second, I will elaborate and contrast the balance sheet policies.
2.1 General Classification of Unconventional Monetary Policies
After the financial crisis that took place in August 2007, the monetary
policy actions that eligible to stimulate the economy are the so called un-
conventional monetary policy tools. These policies have altered the role un-
dertaken by central banks as financial intermediaries which contributes the
predictability of the consequences of this kind of policy stance negatively.
Much of the current literature on unconventional monetary policies leans
against the Krugman, Dominquez and Rogoff (1998). As an escape route
from liquidity trap, they suggested that central banks should try to raise
6
the market’s expectations about future inflation. By this way, real interest
rates would be able to bring down sufficiently to stimulate aggregate demand.
Similarly, Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) argued forward policy guidance
about the future path of policy rates as a compatible policy measure in the
face of zero lower bound. Moreover they divide unconventional monetary
tools that can be adopted in such an environment into three main categories:
1. Providing assurance to investors that short rates will be kept lower in
the future then they currently expect.
2. Increasing the size of the central bank’s balance sheet beyond the level
needed to set the short-term policy rate at zero.
3. Changing the relative supplies of securities in the market place by al-
tering the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet.
Among these three alternatives, the most interesting tools are the balance
sheet policies because after financial crisis, monetary policy actions under-
taken by the central banks were widely associated with significant increases
in central bank balance sheets. Against this background, when they pro-
vide a classification for unconventional monetary policies, Borio and Disyatat
(2009) mainly focused on balance sheet policies and even defined unconven-
tional monetary policies as those where the central bank actively uses its
balance sheet to affect market activity. Furthermore, they have classified
balance sheet policies under three subclasses:
1. Credit policy
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2. Quantitative Easing
3. Exchange rate policy
Table 1 shows the type of balance sheet policies adopted by selected central
banks. In the subsequent sections, I will discuss and document the concepts
of Credit Easing, Quantitative Easing and Exchange Rate Policy in detail.
Moreover, in order to address the difference between liquidity management
policies and Quantitative and credit easing policies, I will address direct liq-
uidity injections as a separate unconventional monetary policy option and
describe it in detail.
2.2 Credit Easing
Central banks’ balance sheets are composed of various kinds of assets.
Thus, if different types of securities are not perfect substitutes for investors,
central banks can influence the relative security prices by changing the com-
position of their balance sheets. Because when they alter the composition
of their balance sheets, the relative supply of securities held by the public
changes and changes in the relative demand and supply affect relative secu-
rity prices. Thus, by altering the composition of its balance sheet, a central
bank can control the yields of financial assets (Bernanke et al. 2004).
The term of credit easing is used to denote such policies. In credit eas-
ing, in order to change the composition of the private sector balance sheets,
central banks change their incurrence to private sector claims. Thus by this
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channel government can affect the real activity of the economy. Borio and
Disyatat (2009) suggest that credit easing policy can be employed through
modifications of colletral, maturity and counterpart terms, or by providing
loans and acquiring private sector claims. Moreover, Fed, Bank of England,
European central bank, Bank of Japan and many other central banks have
widely used credit policies which include broadening eligible collateral and
counterparty coverage, lengthening the maturity of refinancing operations
and establishing inter-central bank swap lines in order to overcome funding
pressures in dollar funding offshore markets. Central banks can implement
two different types of credit easing:
1. Sterilized credit easing
2. Unsterilized credit easing
When implementing sterilized credit easing, central banks compensate the
rise in their monetary bases by selling an equal amount of their assets. On
the other hand, as I will explain in the next section, unsterilized credit eas-
ing does not much differ from quantitative easing. In this case, credit easing
causes a substantial increase in the amount of excess reserve balances. How-
ever essentially, in both types of credit easing, the ultimate aim of credit
easing was not increasing the bank reserves.
2.3 Quantitative Easing
In quantitative easing, central banks increase money supply in order to
finance their asset purchases. After the implementation of this policy, mon-
etary base and reserve balances remain excessively increased. Nevertheless,
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it is possible to find many alternative definitions for quantitative easing. On
the one hand, Bernanke et al (2004) characterizes quantitative easing as poli-
cies which expands the central banks’ balance sheets by increasing the size
of reserve deposits beyond the level that is required to bring policy rate to
zero. On the other hand, Bank of England’s characterization for quantitative
easing is slightly different than that. According to Bank of England, quanti-
tative easing is a monetary policy tool in which central banks purchase both
public and private assets by financing their actions with central bank money
(Benford et al. 2009). Additionally, there are other country specific defini-
tions available in the literature.
However, although the presence of immense number of different defini-
tions of quantitative easing, the coordinating point of these definitions is
quantitative easing always increases the reserve balances and monetary base.
Borio and Disyatat (2009) have suggested two ways of implementing quanti-
tative easing:2
1. Paying interest on reserve balances that depository institutions hold
2. Engaging in offsetting operations that sterilize the impact of the oper-
ations on the amount of bank reserves.
Besides, possible transmission mechanism of quantitative easing is also vehe-
mently discussed in the literature as the empirical findings on the effects
of quantitative easing on economic activity and prices remain uncertain.
2It is important to notice that such ”balance sheet policies” can be executed indepen-
dently of interest rate policies as long as central bank has the means to decouple the two
policies. These types are the ways of achieving this.
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Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) have argued that quantitative easing policies
are complementary to communication policies in effecting the expectations
about future inflation and policy rates as quantitative easing is an indicator
for the central banks intention of holding the short term nominal interest
rate at zero. Because, when central banks keep bank reserves at a higher
level than necessary to keep the interest rate at zero in the future, market
participants perceive this as a promise to keep policy rate at zero.
According to Borio and Disyatat (2009), this kind of unconventional pol-
icy affects economic activity through three channels. First it has portfolio
balance effect. Second, it helps to provide a stronger signal of the central
banks’ commitment to zero interest rate policy. Third, it helps to provide
a permanent increase in money supply which can reduce the expected value
of the government’s debt costs and thus expected value of the future tax
payments reduced. Most famously, Bank of Japan has implemented quanti-
tative easing between the periods April 2001 and March 2006 by switching
its short term interest rate target. Again after the crisis, the Bank of Japan
has increased its purchases of Japanese government bonds. Moreover both
Bank of England and Fed performed purchases of government debt in size-
able amounts.
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2.4 Exchange Rate Policy
When classifying balance sheet policies, unlike the other articles with the
same objective, Borio and Disyatat (2009) do not only consider the unconven-
tional monetary policy options available at the zero lower bound on interest
rate. Instead, they provide a broader definition that includes exchange rate
policy which mostly employed by emerging market economies.
Current literature on unconventional monetary policies predominantly
has built upon the advanced countries. Consequently, literature on exchange
rate policy remains very scarce. In this kind of unconventional policy, the
primary objective is to affect the level and volatility of the exchange rate
at given level of the policy rate such that exposure of the private sector to
foreign currencies is changed.
Among the leading central banks of emerging market economies, Central
Banks of Brazil, Hungary and Mexico has adopted exchange rate policy af-
ter the crisis in order to overcome sudden reversals of capital inflows and
downward pressure on the exchange rate. Moreover, Swiss National Bank
has used exchange rate policy tools as well.
2.5 Liquidity Management Operations
Following the onset of the financial crisis, in order to ease funding con-
ditions, unblock interbank operations and prevent the financial panic from
12
becoming widespread, central banks have started to provide short term liq-
uidity to financial institutions by employing unorthodox liquidity manage-
ment operations.
Practically, depository institutions can get loan in order to cover their
short term liquidity shortage in two ways (Allen, Carletti, 2008):
1. By becoming indebted in interbank market
2. By becoming indebted to central bank
In the first option, commercial banks borrow and lend short term liquidity
to each other. Demand and supply for liquidity determines the equilibrium
interest rate which is called as money market interest rate. In the second
option, depository institutions meet the required liquidity directly from the
central bank’s itself through repurchase agreements, collateralized loans and
standing facilities (Klyuev, de Imus, Srinivasan, 2009). Normally, central
banks use liquidity management operations for the purpose of reaching a
targeted level of short term interest rate. By taking place in such a transac-
tion, central banks reallocate the total liquidity among market participants.
However, under unorthodox conditions, although liquidity management
operations are still applicable, the nature of these policies exhibits a con-
siderable change. For example during financial crisis, in order to raise the
assurance of the market participants about the provision of liquidity will
continue, central banks have lengthened the maturity of their liquidity pro-
vision instruments. Moreover, they have increased the number of applicable
13
collateral and the range of their counterparts.
Nevertheless, an important discrepancy between balance sheet policies
and liquidity management operations remains to be highlighted. When cen-
tral banks inject liquidity into the private sector, monetary base and the
amount of central bank reserves increase in magnitude. However, ultimate
aim, namely increasing the broad money, cannot be achieved unless banks
decide use this extra liquidity to increase the volume of credit. In contrast,
by employing quantitative easing and credit easing, central banks can both
increase the money supply and monetary base at the same time since both
quantitative easing and credit easing are implemented through purchasing
securities directly from the private sector. As it will become obvious in the
next chapter, this distinction between balance sheet policies and liquidity
management operations will become significant due to the deleveraging act
took place during financial crisis.
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CHAPTER 3
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES IN PRACTICE:
CASES OF JAPAN, UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM
AND BRAZIL
In this chapter, I will try to document the heterogeneity in the calibra-
tion and design of unconventional monetary policies described in Chapter 2
based on four countries’ experiences: United States, United Kingdom, Japan
and Brazil. Since these heterogeneities in responses of central banks can be
attributed to the country specific differences in economic and political envi-
ronments, I will provide a general overview about the pre-crisis conjuncture
and monetary policy regime of each country. Then I will examine how coun-
tries have initially responded to financial crisis and how they have practiced
unconventional monetary policies in detail. Finally, I will try to demonstrate
the differences in the implementation of unconventional monetary policies
across countries. Due to the significance of its prior experience with uncon-
ventional monetary policies, in the next section, I will start with the case of
Japan. Then I will continue with the cases of United States, United Kingdom
and Brazil. Finally, I will provide an overall assessment and then conclude.
15
3.1 Case of Japan
Before the financial crisis took place in 2007, due to its everlasting defla-
tionary episodes, Bank of Japan was the first central bank who appealed to
the help of unconventional monetary policy measures in order to achieve sus-
tained economic recovery. Also, current conjuncture reveals that majority of
the advanced economies have fallen into fear of trapping into a deflationary
spiral like in Japan. Thus, it is important to examine the Japan’s monetary
policy regime during 2001-2006 periods as it underlies any study which aims
to examine financial crisis and unconventional monetary policies. Thereafter,
I will briefly give the economic conjuncture of Japan before I proceed to the
Japan’s Past experience with unconventional monetary policies.
3.1.1 Pre-Crisis Economic Conjuncture in Japan
During 1990s, Japanese financial sector started to have a griping pain
due to the bursting of asset bubble which leads a sharp reduction in com-
mercial real estate prices. After the blast, functioning of credit market has
been devastated as reduction in real estate prices has tightened the liquid-
ity constraints and escalated the number of available collaterals. In such
a distressed environment, banks started to loose capital and private sector
started to deleverage by resulting immense losses in economic activity. Fig-
ure 4 shows the development in gross domestic product (GDP) during the
period between 1990 and 2012.
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In order to heal the deteriorating financial sector, stimulate economic
activity and escape from the deflationary pressures, initially, Bank of Japan
started to ease its monetary policy stance by utilizing conventional monetary
policy tools. As reported in Figure 4, policy rate was reduced from 6 percent
to 0.5 percent only in four years. However, since macroeconomic conditions
were not able to ameliorated, in 1999, Bank of Japan has announced its fa-
mous zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) by reducing its policy rate up to 0.02
percent.
Besides ZIRP, Bank of Japan has increased its liquidity provision to the
financial institutions by implementing various types of liquidity management
operations. In order to revive the credit market and thus enabling economic
activity, BoJ has lengthened the maturity of credits and widened the ac-
ceptable range of approved collaterals and counterparts as they started to
accredit commercial papers and asset backed securities as suitable collater-
als. Moreover, they also have provided liquidity to the financial institutions
whenever they needed to ensure financial stability (Baba et al., 2005).
However, despite all these efforts, BoJ could not achieve promoting eco-
nomic activity. Because, when private sector deleverages in the presence
of zero interest rate, economy dives into a deflationary spiral in which eco-
nomic activity persistently slows due to the attrition in aggregate demand
(Koo, 2011). Moreover, under such conditions, if central bank continues to
expand its monetary base by the provision of excessive amounts of liquidity,
money multiplier turns out to be negative and Keynesian liquidity trap oc-
17
curs.
Actually, this was the exact case in Japan. As Figure 5 exhibits, as a re-
sult of the deleveraging act of households and financial institutions, starting
from 1998, increasing monetary base became progressively ineffective on the
amounts of broad money and bank lending. In particular, despite all these
liquidity injected to the corporate sector, required borrowing act could not be
undertaken by financial institutions because financial institutions were con-
siderably occupied by paying debt such that they were not able to borrow
(Koo, 2011). Against this background, instead of the private sector, govern-
ment has undertaken the role of the borrower and has appealed to the means
of unconventional monetary policy in order to escape from the deflationary
spiral. In the next section I will briefly give an overview of the unconven-
tional monetary policy tools adopted in Japan during 2001-2006 periods by
specifically focusing on balance sheet policies.
In March 2001, Bank of Japan has started to implement unconventional
monetary policy measures by introducing quantitative easing. The aim of
this policy was to attain the bank’s operating target of current account bal-
ances (CABs) held by financial institutions through purchasing government
securities (Berkmen, 2012).
In fact, Japanese quantitative easing consisted of three parts. First, BoJ
has released that it it would target the outstanding balance of current ac-
count balances instead of overnight call rate. Second, in order to reach the
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targeted value, Boj has started to purchase long term Japanese government
bonds instead of the short term government debt. Finally, BoJ committed
that it would continue to employ these policy measures until economy es-
capes from deflationary pressures.
After adoption of quantitative easing, in 2001, BoJ has announced that
the target for CABs was U5 trillion. In 2004, it has raised the target up
to U35 trillion. Respectively, the amount of monthly outright purchases of
long term government bonds has bounced from U400 billion to U1.2 trillion
only in one year (Ito and Mishkin, 2004). After the first year of quantitative
easing, Japanese central bank also started to perform monetary policy appli-
ance which alters the composition of BoJ’s balance sheet such as purchasing
equities held by the commercial banks and asset backed securities of small
sized firms (Kimura and Small, 2004). After achievement of the positive core
CPI rates, BoJ dismissed quantitative easing in March 2006.
3.1.2 Post-Crisis Central Banking Policies in Japan
After financial crisis hit the economy, Japan has experienced a momen-
tous decline in its real GDP growth rate in 2008 as it descended up to -6.2
percent. However, at variance with the previous episode of severe contraction
in economic activity, BoJ did not react to the developments in the financial
market by immediately adopting unconventional monetary policy measures.
Instead, in order to ease the financial conditions and promote the financial
stability, BoJ have started to sign bilateral currency liquidity agreement with
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the US and first time in its history, injected foreign exchange into the do-
mestic market (Bernanke, 2009).
Moreover, as BoJ have reduced both target rate and the discount rate
up to 0.1 percent and to avert the overnight call rate from falling below the
target rate and provide additional liquidity, BoJ introduced complementary
deposit facility in which it started to pay interest on excess balances over this
rate. Finally, in December 2008, when overnight call rate eventually reached
its binding lower bound, once again BoJ has started to adopt unconventional
monetary policy measures. However in this time, Japanese central bank has
used its balance sheet to effect economic activity by the means much similar
to the credit easing policy instead of the quantitative easing.
Onset of the 2009, BoJ increased its outright purchases of commercial
papers and BBB-rated corporate bonds as approved collaterals in order to
focus on specific sectors. Moreover, BoJ has established complementary de-
posit facilities in order to provide liquidity to the financial sector (Shirakawa,
2010). However, after the arising fact that these measures were inadequate
to meet its expectations, BoJ started to accelerate the recovery by intro-
ducing comprehensive monetary easing policy in October 2010. Generally,
comprehensive monetary easing policy consists of two subsections:
1. Committing zero interest rate policy until price stability fall in a posi-
tive targeted range
2. Introducing a new asset purchase program which includes other types of
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assets along with government securities such as exchange-traded funds
(ETFs) and real estate investment trusts (REITs)
After the policy measures undertaken by the BoJ, money market conditions
eased and economic activity increased. In March and April 2010, Bank of
Japan chose to terminate some of the tentative measures such as provision
of subordinated loans to banks, special funds-supplying operations that sup-
port corporate financing and stock purchases held by financial institutions.
In March 2011, Bank of Japan has sharply increased the size of its balance
sheet once again aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami in East Japan as
it responded immediately to this disaster and injected U15 trillion into the
interbank market.
3.2 Case of United States
3.2.1 Pre-Crisis Economic Conjuncture in United States
Federal Reserve Act section 2A clearly defines the Fed’s mandate as:
“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open
Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit
aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase
production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment,
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”3
3However, although ensuring and stabilizing low level of inflation is one of the main
targets of the Fed, it never announced that Fed is an explicit inflation targeter.
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Before the financial crisis, commonly appealed policy tools to control the
policy rate were the open market operations (OMOs). Fed was purchasing
secondary market securities and conducting repurchase agreements to con-
trol monetary aggregates and economic activity thusly. Besides, in order to
alleviate the short term funding pressures on depository institutions, Fed was
performing discount window facilities by offering specifically primary credit,
secondary credit and seasonally credit to large, medium and small sized firms
respectively. Moreover, according to the section 13.3 of the Federal Reserve
Act, market participants4 whose failure has the probability of becoming a
negative shock for the overall functioning of the economy could be desig-
nated and provided liquidity by the Fed (Fleming, 2012). However, in 2006
times, what is called as “normal times” has ended with a distortion emerged
in real estate market while housing prices started to decease. Moreover, in
the following year, prices of mortgage-backed securities have begun to fall
due to the increasing skepticism about the real value of the assets in real
estate market (Reis, 2010). Moreover, as a result general implementation of
high levels of securitization, financial institutions started to declare immense
losses (Reis, 2010). Thus a mercurial decadence in financial conditions and
funding markets has begun.
3.2.2 Post-Crisis Central Banking Policies in United States
Onset of the financial turmoil, as the majority of the central banks, Fed
started to aggressively decrease the federal funds rate as a part of its expan-
4Market participants other than the depository institutions such as individuals, part-
nerships, and corporations.
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sionary monetary policy. As it is apparent from Figure 1a, starting from 5.25
percent for the beginning of 2007, Fed has reduced its policy rate up to 0.02
percent by the end of 2008. When policy rate hit to the zero lower bound,
Fed started to announce its target rate as a range and committed to keep
zero interest rate in the future.
Besides, in order to provide liquidity to the financial institutions, im-
proving financial conditions and stimulate economic growth, Fed supported
its interest rate policy by introducing various types of new liquidity and
credit programs. In fact, this period of monetary policy can be designated as
credit easing since the implementation of this facilities caused considerable
increases in central bank balance sheets by altering its composition at the
same time. In general, these facilities can be classified as follows:
1. Lending facilities to depository institutions
2. Lending facilities to the other financial institutions and investors
3. Central bank liquidity swaps
4. Support to the specific institutions
More specifically, as a part of the lending facilities to the depository insti-
tutions, In December 2007, Fed has introduced the Term Auction Facility
(TAF). The main aim was to ease the financial conditions, provide liquidity
to financial institutions and unblock the interbank operations. Large sized
depository institutions allowed participating in the TAF while TAF has ter-
minated in March 2010 due to the ameliorated conditions in funding market.
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To provide liquidity to the financial institutions other than depository in-
stitutions, Fed has utilized the primary dealer credit facility (PDCF), term
Securities lending facility (TSLF) Commercial paper funding facility (CPFF),
asset-backed commercial paper money market mutual fund liquidity facility
(AMLF) and money market investor funding facility (MMIFF) and Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). Table 2 gives the complete
overview of the facilities that the Fed established during the financial crisis.
Although these facilities have been administered aggressively in order to be-
calm the liquidity pressures in financial markets, almost all of these programs
have been terminated before 2010.
Liquidity shortages in financial markets were not limited to the United
States because interbank market operations were blocked due to the un-
foreseeable conditions of the world economy. Particularly, emerging market
economies were not able to meet the demand for foreign currency in their do-
mestic markets, especially for US dollar. Thus, in order to lend assistance to
the foreign central banks in their provision of dollar liquidity to their deposi-
tory institutions, Fed has signed bilateral currency swap agreements with 14
central banks around the world. The specific target of these swap lines were
actually emerging countries however, Fed have also signed bilateral currency
swap agreements with some advanced country’s central banks such as Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB), Bank of England (BoE), Bank of Japan (BoJ)
and Swiss National Bank (SNB). In a similar fashion to the lending facilities
to the financial institutions, liquidity swap facilities have also terminated in
February 2010.
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However, as I have stated in the previous chapter, when central banks
inject liquidity into the private sector, monetary base and the amount of
central bank reserves increase. However, ultimate aim, namely increasing
the broad money, cannot be achieved unless financial institutions decide to
use this extra liquidity in order to increase the volume of credit. Evidently,
again as shown in Figure 5, Fed’s colossal injections of liquidity to the finan-
cial sector failed to increase the amount of available credit for the private
sector and achieved only a slight increase in the broad money.
This was a massive admonition of falling into a liquidity trap. Thus, by
taking lessons from Japanese experiment with unconventional monetary poli-
cies, beginning from 2008, Fed has started to implement quantitative easing
policies in order to abstain from falling into a liquidity trap and stimulate
economy.
According to Fed’s definition of quantitative easing, focus of policy should
be on the quantity of bank reserves while the composition of central bank’s
balance sheet remains unaltered. In contrast, Fed has utilized credit easing
policy as a simple liquidity injection tool while the main focus was on com-
position of the assets that Fed holds (Bernanke, 2009a). In the second half
of the 2008, Fed has started to implement quantitative easing by officially
labeling it as large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs). Normally, Fed purchase
securities through temporary and permanent OMOs. Temporary OMOs are
the market operations which include daily liquidity management operations
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of Fed such as REPOs or reserve repurchase agreements. On the other hand,
permanent open market operations are used to expand the size of Fed’s bal-
ance sheet by increasing the currency in circulation. After 2008, Fed had
utilized permanent open market operations to implement quantitative eas-
ing by introducing two types of long term asset purchase program:
1. Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities Purchase Program
2. Purchase of Government Debt
Fed has enforced quantitative easing in two phases. During the period be-
tween 2008 and 2010, Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has un-
dertaken the first period of quantitative easing (QE1) as announcing that
it would increase its purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS),
agency debt and longer-term Treasury securities up to $1.25 trillion, $200
billion and $300 billion respectively. In August 2010, the FOMC has rein-
forced QE1 by further increasing its long term asset purchases by announcing
that it would reinvest the revenue earned from the agency-related securities
investments in longer-term treasuries in order to keep the existing dollar
stock on its balance sheet (Reis, 2010).Overall, QE1 period has amounted
$1.725 trillion at the end. This amount corresponds to the 12.1 percent of
the United States’ nominal GDP of 2008 which equals to $14.3 trillion.5
After the completion of QE1, FOMC undertook a second quantitative
easing period (QE20) between November 2010 and June 2011 by purchasing
$600 billion of long-term treasuries. The total amount of additional QE2
5See Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack, 2011 p.54
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purchases brought the total amount of large scale asset purchases to $2.325
trillion at the end of the 2011. Again this number coincides the 16.3 percent
of the United States’ GDP of 2008.
3.3 Case of United Kingdom
3.3.1 Pre-Crisis Economic Conjuncture in United Kingdom
After the foreign exchange rate crisis took place in 1992, Bank of England
(BoE) has declared itself as inflation targeter to increase the damaged credi-
bility of the monetary policy actions. However until 1997, BoE has not gained
its independency and the authority to implement monetary policy was belong
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer while the main occupation of BoE was
forecasting inflation and evaluating the past inflation performance through
public recommendations (Bernanke et al, 1999). Aftermath of gaining its
independence, BoE has undertook the responsibility of designing monetary
policy to ensure price stability.
Currently BoE continues to adopt flexible inflation targeting regime. Be-
fore the financial crisis, main tools for maintaining the targeted inflation level
were conventional interest rate policies.6 According to current governing law;
whenever inflation falls below one percent and goes above three percent, BoE
has to send an open letter to the Chancellor which explains the reasons of
this variation and the policy actions that are intended to be taken (Bank of
6The inflation target of two percent is a point target, but with “thresholds” on both
sides.
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England 2010c).
Before financial crisis took place, BoE has noticed the danger posed by
the persistently growing macroeconomic aggregates in their open letter to
Chancellor. For example, from 2002 to 2007, annual rate of growth of broad
money was 10 percent. Moreover, according to OECD’s economic outlook
report in 2010, volume of credit has increased much more than the nominal
income and private lending to the private sector. As a result of this accretion
in volume of credit, domestic economic growth expanded causing an immense
increment in asset prices. However, after financial crisis hit the economy, the
situation has reversed while United Kingdom’s GDP has fallen significantly
and financial markets has gone under stress. After that, BoE has started to
undertake policy actions which include historically colossal liquidity insur-
ances and operations (Fisher, 2009).
3.3.2 Post-Crisis Central Banking Policies in United Kingdom
In the awake of the financial crisis, BoE has lowered the policy rate from
5 percent to 0.5 percent between October 2008 and March 2009 (Figure 1a).
Afterwards, the monetary policy committee (MPC) has announced that 0.5
percent as the floor for the policy rate since lowering the policy rate any
further would be unreasonable. Because in United Kingdom, most of the
lending products was indexed to the policy rate which means lowering the
policy rate any further would destroy the lenders’ interest revenue and con-
tract the credit market thusly (Meier, 2009).
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Besides these policy rate cuts, BoE has started to increase its lending
operations as UK banks started to hold extra reserves by increasing their
targets by £ 1.1 billion. During September 2007, BoE has injected extra
liquidity into the financial sector amounted £9 billion. Moreover, they have
increased the target ranges for remunerated reserves aiming to reduce the
excess reserves that are held by the commercial banks. Additionally, BoE
has started to pay interest on reserve (OECD, 2010).
In normal times, BoE utilize monetary policy through the means of the
Sterling Monetary Framework (SMF) such that this framework allows BoE
to gain ascendance over the amount of liquidity in order to keep policy rate
consistent with the central bank’s targets. Generally, liquidity management
operations are employed in order to reduce the distortions in the liquidity
and payments services of commercial banks by providing short-term liquidity.
Before the financial crisis, SMF was consisted of three main elements: Reserve
accounts, standing facilities and open market operations (Fisher, 2009). After
the crisis BoE started to providing liquidity by extending these facilities. In
particular, these extended facilities can be classified as follows:
1. Extended Collateral three-month repo OMOs
2. Special Liquidity Scheme
3. Discount Window Facility
4. Central Bank Liquidity Swaps at the BoE
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5. The one-week Bank of England Bill
By using these facilities BoE has injected liquidity into economy more than
£ 180 billion up to January 2009. In contrast with Fed, the usage of liquidity
management facilities by BoE was considerably limited. Again, these facili-
ties were merely the extensions of already existing facilities. Despite the fact
that average maturity of reverse repo operations has increased aftermath of
the financial crisis, BoE did not interfere in the determination process of the
longer term funding market. The only minuscular change has took place in
the implementation of 3-month reverse repo operations after the introduction
of special liquidity scheme (SLS) as it aimed to ease the interbank funding
conditions by increasing the number of acceptable collaterals.
Overall, liquidity management operations that are adopted after financial
crisis actually are very different between United States and United Kingdom
in their essence. In United Kingdom, liquidity management operations can-
not be addressed as credit easing as it was almost affectless in changing the
composition of the central bank’s assets significantly. Thus, it is obvious that
BoE has kept its traditional position while performing liquidity management
operations. This reveals that, in opposition to the United States, the main
purpose behind the implementation of these liquidity management opera-
tions was to heal the unperforming banking system instead of promoting the
aggregate demand.
When the policy rate reached its effective lower bound, BoE decided to
implement unconventional monetary policy tools in order to achieve the 2
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percent CPI inflation target in the medium term. Thus, on March 2009,
BoE has introduced the quantitative easing as an asset purchasing program
of £75 billion financed by the issuance of the central bank’s money. After the
declaration of the quantitative easing, BoE has announced that it altered its
policy instrument from the short-term interest rate to the quantity of money
provided. Moreover, BoE also stated that its policy aim is still reaching to
the 2 percent inflation target.
Before the introduction of quantitative easing, BoE has already estab-
lished Asset Purchase Facility (APF) as a subsidiary of the Bank of England
on January 30th 2009. At the beginning, facility has served as sterilized
credit easing and supported conventional monetary policy as its objective
was to improve liquidity in central markets and increase flow of corporate
credit through purchases of high-quality private sector assets. These pur-
chases were initially financed through the issuance of treasury bills. This
facility has conducted purchases of commercial paper, corporate bonds, gov-
ernment guaranteed bank bonds, asset backed paper from viable securitiza-
tion structures, and syndicated loans (Meier 2009, BOE Quarterly Report
APF Q1 2009). In February 2009, the BoE started buying unsecured corpo-
rate bonds, and started to concentrate on the primary market.
However, after the introduction of quantitative easing, the scope of the
Asset Purchase Facility has been enlarged and it became a separate mon-
etary policy tool. Thereafter, In contrast with the previous period, asset
purchases regarding this program started to be financed through issuance of
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base money instead of Treasury bills. The APF was initially authorized to
buy assets up to a total of £150 billion, where £50 billion were designated to
private sector assets. However, when total amount of purchased government
bonds (gilts) increased up to £198 billion, total amount was later extended
to £200 billion which coincides the 14 percent of the UK’s GDP for 2010.7
After 2010, BoE has started to sterilize its purchases in order to maintain
market stability and prevent financial conditions from disturbing the wider
economy. In March 2010 the Monetary Policy Committee announced that
the full amount of asset purchases would be held at £200 billion. Thus, re-
cently only small, selected and sterilized purchases of corporate debt have
been conducted.
3.4 Case of Brazil
When the financial crisis has broken out, its destructive impact on emerg-
ing countries was considerably limited due to their strong fiscal and economic
conditions. As a result, most scholars and policy makers have focused on the
malfunctioning financial markets in advanced countries by considering that
emerging countries would be able to perpetuate their strong performance and
remain unaffected from the severe negative aggregate demand socks. More-
over, after the onset of the financial crisis, the main problem for emerging
countries was the inflation pressures as capital flows and credit volume ex-
7At the end of the first quarter of 2010, the gilt holdings in the facility amounted to
99 % of total holdings.
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panded.
Nevertheless, the failure of the Lehman Brothers in September2008 has
radically changed the status. Emerging countries’ economies started to get
distressed as the collapse of Lehman Brothers has triggered an immense con-
traction in credit and capital markets as well as international trade by coun-
tries dependent on commodity exports. Against this background, these coun-
tries have started to experience significant macroeconomic fluctuations and
suffer from the fiscal and external slenderness. In order to overcome this
malfunctioning, emerging countries has also expanded their policy tools but
different than the advanced economies.
In this context, in order to emphasize this heterogeneity, examining the
monetary policy actions of the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) constitutes
a good example as Brazil is one of the world’s largest emerging market
economies and dominates the market on the South America.
3.4.1 Pre-Crisis Economic Conjuncture in Brazil
After the blast of major currency crisis in 1999, Brazil has declared itself
as an inflation targeter by terminating exchange rate targeting regime in or-
der to prevent massive devaluation of the real as the main mandate of the
Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) was to ensure price stability.
After the adoption of the inflation targeting, an immense uncertainty
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about the maintenance of the inflation targeting regime has occurred and
BCB has mostly suffered from severe exchange rate depreciations, fast eco-
nomic growth and rapid credit expansions. Consequently, as an export-led
economy, Brazil started to deviate from standart inflation targeting8 by being
an implicit exchange rate targeter as it widely intervened in foreign exchange
markets and imposed taxes and used other types of controls on international
capital flows (Cunha, Ferrari-Filho, Prates, 2011).
In 2007, BCB started to adopt additional fiscal policy tools in order
to support the implementation of the Growth Acceleration Program. As a
result, BCB has started to give current account surpluses, increase its in-
ternational reserve accumulations and grow at around 6 percent annually.
Moreover, Brazil has started to accomplish substantial trade balances and
improved trade situation as a result of the immense capital flows into the
economy (IMF, 2006).
Against this background, BCB has met financial crisis under very strong
financial system and economic conditions. Consequently, BCB has conde-
scended the omnipotence of the financial crisis and they have taken no extra
counter-cyclical movements in order to abstain from the effects of this finan-
cial turmoil. Nevertheless, after the reduction by 3.6 percent in GDP for
the last quarter of 2008 has been announced, Brazil started to take financial
8In theory, monetary authorities in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and
Uruguay follows the orthodoxy of inflation targeting, which considers that ensuring price
stability is the main (perhaps the only) goal of monetary policy and short term interest
rates should be the only instrument used to achieve the inflation target while exchange
rate should float freely.
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crises serious.
3.4.2 Post-Crisis Central Banking Policies in Brazil
After the financial crisis showed its effects on Brazilian economy, signif-
icant contractions in liquidity in the interbank market have taken place as
companies started to loose exchange derivatives which caused by the deval-
uation of real. Thus, in order to ease financial conditions, Copom and BCB
started to decrease the Selic (Brazil’s policy rate) and inject liquidity into
the interbank market. As shown in the Figure 1b, the Selic has been reduced
from 13.75 percent to 8.75 percent during the period between December 2008
and September 2009.9
Additionally, in order to inject extra liquidity into interbank market and
refinance the smaller banks, Copom and BCB has started to implement a
broad set of policies in order to meet the domestic liquidity demand and
credit shortage. More specifically, liquidity in the interbank market has been
controlled through:
1. Reserve requirement policies
2. Federal system of public financing characterized by the existence of
large and relevant public banks
9Interest rate reductions in Brazil started with delay as the threat of inflation caused
by the devaluation of the real was high. Thus the monetary policy conducted by the BCB
in the last quarter of 2008 strongly contrasted with the actions of the principal advanced
and emerging economies.
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In particular, the main aim behind the liquidity injection policies was to en-
tail the financial system stability by solving the liquidity problems of banking
system and minimizing the distortions that block the functioning of the credit
market by providing credit to non-financial corporations.
In the last quarter of 2008, when Brazilian companies started to suffer
from the shortage of liquidity in foreign currency, BCB has started to provide
liquidity by utilizing its international reserves (amounted $205 billion) and
sold $14.5 billion in the spot market. Moreover, in order to alleviate the dis-
tressed financial market, BCB has signed bilateral currency swap agreements
at a valuation of $50 billion and injected $11.8 billion of this swaps into the
system through repurchase agreements.
Moreover, BCB started use reserve requirements and discount window fa-
cilities in order to increase and reallocate banking reserves and federal public
securities liquidity. For example BCB has enlarged the functions of Credit
Guarantor Fund (CGF)10 to solve the liquidity problems of small sized banks
while it decreased the amount of reserve requirements and reduced the tax
rate on demand and savings deposit to provide liquidity into the whole bank-
ing system.
More specifically, as a part of the reduction process in reserve require-
ments, BCB has injected $116 billion into financial system, almost 50% of
10The Fundo Garantidor de Cre´ditos (FGC) is a deposit guarantee system that es-
tablished in 1995 as “a private non-profit organization to control the protection of credit
holders against financial institutions”.
36
the total amount of the required reserves in the period aftermath of the cri-
sis that coincided 4% of the GDP of 2009. Besides, the range of approved
collaterals has been increased as BCB started to accept multifarious banking
assets as collateral such as loans and private bonds. At the same time BCB
has increased its authority to assist the Brazilian financial institutions that
writhe in liquidity shortage by permitting to obtain credit portfolios from
financial institutions. This permission has been granted through rediscount
window facilities.
All these actions have contributed to the competence of the liquidity
conditions of financial institutions and specifically, small and medium sized
corporations. However, the scope of the actions that are adopted by BCB in
order to respond the effects of financial crisis was not limited with liquidity
easing measures. In fact, interbank lending activity still remained distorted
despite all of this easement in monetary policy stance. Thus, Brazilian gov-
ernment has generated additional measures to normalize credit conditions
for non-financial market participants and increase the volume of credit pro-
vided by the private banks through controlling public banks namely Banco
do Brasil (BB) and Caixa Econoˆmica Federal (CEF) and Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Econoˆmico e Social (BNDES).
The role of these three public banks was extremely crucial in terms of pre-
venting further reductions in economic activity and perpetuating the supply
of credit to individuals and companies while private banks desired to keep
high liquidity. In particular, BB CEF and BNDES have tried to unblock in-
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terbank operations by increasing their credit operations, acquiring the prob-
lematic small and medium sized institutions’ credit portfolios and reducing
the loans’ interest rates. As a result, according to BCB’s reports, their par-
ticipation on the credit system rose from 33% to 42% during the period
between June 2008 and September 2009. Moreover, during this period, the
credit provided by these three public banks has increase by 61%.
After that point, Brazilian government has intensively used fiscal policy
measures included the stimulus package adopted by the Ministry of Finance,
as well as other fiscal measures, which even though are not components of
this package, were also important to mitigate the negative impact of the in-
ternational financial crisis on the economic activity and financial conditions.
3.5 Cross-Country Comparison of Post-Crisis Central Banking
Policies
In this section, I will try to analyze and contrast the post-crisis policy re-
sponses and implementation of unconventional policy measures of these four
countries.
The picture that I have plotted in the previous sections yields that the
policy responses from BoJ, Fed, BoE, and even BCB have several common
features as all central banks have eased the monetary conditions and by
increasing the size of their balance sheets significantly, provide excessive
amounts of liquidity into their financial markets in order to revive economic
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activity and fix the functioning of the credit markets (Figure 7).
However, as I have tried to point out, there are some serious discrimina-
tive features in each country which effect the implementation of monetary
policy. In particular, regarding unconventional monetary policy measures,
these differences in implementing monetary policy can be characterized into
two subgroups: (I) Diversified implementation of the same type of uncon-
ventional monetary policy (II) Adoption of different types of unconventional
monetary policy.11
In particular, the root of the first type of discrepancy can be traced back
to the differences in economic structures of these four countries. As I have
documented above, central banks of United States and United Kingdom has
widely used unconventional monetary policy measures in the form of credit
easing and quantitative easing. However, Brazilian central bank has only
relied on exchange rate policies and reserve requirements. This is because
Brazil has less developed domestic financial system while markets for se-
curities and corporate bonds are much smaller. Moreover, as documented
in the first chapter, Brazilian central bank was not obligated to implement
quantitative easing and credit easing in order to ease monetary conditions
since Brazil faced financial crisis under much solid financial conditions and
BCB’s policy kit was significantly wider in contrast to the BoJ, Fed and BoE.
11My definition for types of unconventional monetary policy follows Borio and Disy-
atat’s classification described in chapter 2.
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Other than this, before 2009, it is apparent that the focus of BoJ on un-
conventional monetary policy measures similarly remained limited compared
with Fed and BoE. Before the financial crises, the size of the balance sheet
of BoJ was much bigger than the Both Fed’s and BoE’s balance sheets while
the balance sheet of BoJ now is the smallest one among them in terms of
bank notes outstanding in August 2009(IMF, 2010b).
The second type of discrepancy becomes obvious when the cases of United
States and United Kingdom have been investigated in detail. Despite the fact
that both countries balance sheets rose dramatically in scale and they both
adopt aggressive quantitative easing policy, the accumulated composition of
their balance sheets exhibits immense heterogeneity (Figure 8).
First difference emerges from the relative importance of credit markets in
UK and US. As described in sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.2, during financial crisis,
Fed has intervened actively in credit markets and focused on broader finan-
cial markets and private sector regarding the importance of these markets
as a source of finance in the US. However, on the other hand, BoE has par-
ticularly avoided from intervening in the credit markets by maintaining its
traditional central bank role and it has been actively involved in government
bond markets as I have suggested above.
Apart from this, another source of difference is that BoE employs flexible
inflation targeting regime with a declared objective of achieving the inflation
target of two percent in the medium run. However, Fed did not admit an
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explicit gauge as a target of inflation although preserving inflation at low lev-
els is one of the three mandates of the Fed. This represents an institutional
difference between the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve.
Overall, against this background, post-crisis policy experiences of these
four countries reveal that there is a considerable heterogeneity in design and
calibration of unconventional monetary policies. In general, these hetero-
geneities emerge from country specific objectives and discrepancies in eco-
nomic and political environments of countries such as structure of their fi-
nancial systems, institutional arrangements of their central banks and finally
the types and origins of the shocks that hit their economy. Also, restricting
conditions such as zero lower bound on interest rate and falling into a liquid-
ity trap have fomented these differences much further.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF UNCONVENTIONAL
MONETARY POLICIES
In this chapter I will explore the dynamic effects of unconventional mon-
etary policy shocks on economic activity and prices. In previous chapters
I have stated that there exist heterogeneity in the design and calibration
of unconventional monetary policies across countries. Thus, subsequently,
an answer to the question “is there any heterogeneity in the effects of un-
conventional monetary policies on macro economy across countries?” will
be investigated based on the four country experiences. The analysis in this
chapter will be conducted by estimating a structural vector autoregressive
model (SVAR) with monthly data over the sample period 2008 January-2012
February. First, a literature review on the effects of unconventional monetary
policies on macro economy will be given. Second, the model and the data
will be described. Finally, estimation results will be presented.
4.1 Literature Review
Before the financial crisis, an extensive literature has investigated the
impact of the conventional monetary policy tools on real activity and in-
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flation. However still, little is known about the macroeconomic effects of
the unconventional monetary policies. Thus the literature on the effects of
unconventional policies on macro economy continues to expanding since a
better understanding of the impact of unconventional monetary policies is
essential for the policymakers and needed to construct theoretical monetary
models.
Much of the literature that measures the effectiveness of unconventional
monetary policies has focused on the advanced economies and the effects of
unconventional monetary policies on the financial markets. Christensen et
al. (2009), Taylor and Williams (2009) have focused on the effects of cen-
tral banks’ liquidity measures on money market yields in the first stage of
the crisis. On the other hand, Hamilton and Wu (2010), D’Amico and King
(2010), Wright (2011) has focused on the effects of large scale asset purchases
on long-term interest rates and other asset prices.
Despite the fact that estimated quantitative effects of unconventional
monetary policies vary across different studies, in general the results of these
papers suggest that this kind of policies are effective in lowering financial
market yields. Taylor and Williams (2009) have found that Federal Re-
serve’s Term Auction Facility was initially not effective in bringing down
money market yields because the effects of the program on total liquidity
supply was sterilized by government securities sales. On the other hand, the
macroeconomic effects of the unconventional monetary policies have mostly
been neglected. There exist few papers that assess the effects of unconven-
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tional monetary policies on macroeconomic aggregates. Chung et al. (2011),
Lenza et al. (2011), Peersman (2011) have estimated the macroeconomic
effects of unconventional monetary policies. However their estimation was
based on the models constructed before the financial crisis. Thus, the fallacy
of these papers is that their models may not be appropriate to analyze the
effects of monetary policy on macro economy during a financial crisis.
In this chapter, in order to overcome with this problem, as in the spirit
of Peersman and Smith (2003) and Peersman (2011) a structural vector au-
toregression model has been adopted to analytically analyze the dynamic
effects of unconventional monetary policies on economic activity and prices
based on four country’s data. In the light of these results, effectiveness of
unconventional monetary policies on economic activity and prices has been
investigated and the question “are there any heterogeneity in the effects of
unconventional monetary policies on macroeconomy across countries?” has
been answered.
4.2 Specification of the VAR Model
The benchmark specification of the structural vector autoregressive model
has the following form:
Yt = α + A(L)Yt−1 +Bt (1)
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables containing variables output yt,
prices pt, level of policy rate it and the monetary base mt. α is a vector
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of constants and B is the contemporaneous impact matrix of the mutually
uncorrelated disturbances t. A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag opera-
tor L. In order to allow implicit co-integrating relationships in the data, all
variables except interest rate are in log levels in the spirit of Sims, Stock and
Watson (1990).
As we stated clearly in Chapter 3, after financial crisis, main policy in-
strument became a quantitative aggregate and quantitative rules took place
of the interest rate rules (Bullard 2009). Majority of the countries have con-
ducted unconventional monetary policy in the form of outstanding purchases
of government securities, i.e., central banks have enormously increased their
balance sheets. Thus, in our benchmark model, we simply take unconven-
tional monetary policy as total liquidity injected by central banks to the
economy. In my model, the selected indication of total liquidity of central
banks is monetary base mt. In particular, within this standard framework,
the specification of my VAR model implies that balance sheet policies re-
spond to the economic activity, price level and level of the policy rate.
I identify an unconventional monetary policy shock as an exogenous in-
novation to the central bank balance sheet. In order to identify exogenous
balance sheet shock, I imposed zero restrictions on the matrix B. To this end;
I have classified GDP and CPI as non-policy variables and monetary base
and interest rate as policy variables. In the line with the existing literature
policy variables have no contemporaneous effect on non-policy variables while
current developments in the non-policy variables can affect policy variables
45
contemporaneously. More specifically, I impose zero restriction on contem-
poraneous effects of monetary base and interest rate on economic activity
and prices. On the other hand contemporaneous impact of economic activity
and prices on monetary base and interest rate is left completely unrestricted.
VAR equation is estimated over sample period January 2008 - May 2012
with four country’s data: United States, United Kingdom, Japan and Brazil.
All data were taken from IMF financial statistics database. All variables have
monthly frequency and seasonally adjusted. I have used data of industrial
production as a proxy for output since monthly data for real gross domestic
product were not available.
In order to estimate the SVAR model I have used the econometric pack-
age JmulTi. Model is estimated by feasible generalized least squares (GLS).
For this purpose, as a first step, individual equations of the systems are es-
timated by ordinary least squares (OLS) method. As a result, standard im-
pulse response functions have been acquired. Moreover, one standard error
confidence bands for the impulse response are generated through bootstrap-
ping technique. I have considered 50 future periods in all estimations.
In choosing a suitable lag length for the SVAR model, I have utilized
Schwarz information criterion for the full system of equations. As a simple
gauge for the model stability, eigenvalues of the companion matrix of the
SVAR model has been checked. According to Schwarz information criteria
the optimum lag length is two for all estimations in the model. Thus, I
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use two lag lengths for my model as it is sufficient enough to capture the
dynamics of the model and does not cause attrition of degrees of freedom.
Furthermore, diagnostic tests resulted that, the absolute values of eigenval-
ues of the VAR companion matrix are all less then unity. Thus, my SVAR
model turns out to be stationary and my estimations are stable.
4.3 Empirical Results
In this section, I will present the responses of the economic activity, in-
flation and interest rate to an unconventional monetary policy shock.
Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11 exhibit the response of economic ac-
tivity, prices and interest rate to an exogenous innovation in unconventional
monetary policy for four countries respectively. The solid lines represent
the estimated response while two dashed lines represent the 95 percentile
confidence intervals. Broadly, an immediate conclusion that can be derived
from the estimation results is that unconventional monetary policies are ef-
fective in United States and United Kingdom while its effects only found to
be marginally significant in Japan and insignificant in Brazil.
In particular, unconventional monetary policy has a significant positive
temporary impact on both economic activity and prices in United States
and United Kingdom. On the other hand, in Japan, output reaction be-
comes only marginally significant after approximately twelve months as from
unconventional monetary policy shock while price response is insignificant.
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In the Brazilian case, although positive responses are estimated in both eco-
nomic activity and prices, they unfortunately remain insignificant.
Now, In order to put the estimates into a better perspective, I will com-
pare these estimates with the actual developments in these macroeconomic
variables case by case and try to explain the source of differences in the ef-
fectiveness of unconventional monetary policies.
4.3.1 Response of GDP to Unconventional Monetary Policy
Unconventional monetary policies came into effect in 2008 and 2009 in
United States, Brazil and United Kingdom, Japan respectively. Figure 6a
shows that all four countries output has dampened sharply at the time when
unconventional monetary policies first introduced. As I have specified my
model accordingly, there is no instant effect of unconventional monetary poli-
cies on economic activity. Consistently with the results of the experiment,
approximately nine months after the adoption of unconventional monetary
policies, real GDPs of United States and United Kingdom start growing as
they reach their peak after twelve months. Thus, this amelioration in eco-
nomic activity in US and UK can be attributed to the effectiveness of uncon-
ventional monetary policies adopted during this period. On the other hand,
although a significant rise in real GDP of Brazil and Japan is also evident af-
ter five months later as from the adoption of unconventional monetary policy
measures, empirical results suggest unconventional monetary policies played
only a limited role for in Japan and no role in Brazil. In Japan, effects of
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exogenous unconventional monetary policy shock become merely significant
after ten months and remains significant for approximately ten months as
the persistence of the shock on economic activity is considerably low and in
Brazil effects of shock on economic activity completely insignificant.
The peculiarity of the Japanese and Brazilian results seems to be due to
the fact that these two countries have utilized the unconventional balance
sheet policies to a much lesser extent compared with the United States and
United Kingdom. As a result, pinning down the effects of unconventional
monetary policy shocks is much harder. As I have stated in Chapter 3, after
quitting quantitative easing policies in 2006 Japanese central bank have not
escalated its balance sheet again until the mid 2009s as its banking sector
remained in a relatively better position after the crisis. Thus this can explain
the low persistence of policy shock on economic activity in Japan.
For the case of Brazil, apart from the low usage of unconventional mon-
etary policies, the fact that fiscal measures that have been adopted by the
Ministry of Finance of Brazil might have hindered the effects of unconven-
tional monetary policies in Brazil. For example in 2009, Ministry of Finance
in Brazil has announced a 2 percent Tobin tax which covers investment in-
flows (except direct inflows) for equity and fixed-income securities. The ra-
tionale behind the tax was to defend weakening Brazilian real and encourage
the Brazilian industries and exports which caused an appreciation in real
by 35 percent and accelerated capital inflows. Thus the sudden accretion in
Brazil’s economic activity can be ascribed to these types of fiscal stimulus
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measures.
4.3.2 Response of CPI to Unconventional Monetary Policy
Figure 6b illustrates the development in consumer price index of four
countries. As it is apparent from the figure, The CPI indices had started
to decline in all countries already before the adaption of the unconventional
monetary policies. Again, significant expansions in the balance sheets of
countries had no instant positive effect on inflation rates. Approximately
nine months after the adoption of unconventional monetary policies, con-
sumer price indexes started to rise again. This dynamic of consumer price
index is compatible with the results of my empirical investigation as it cap-
tures a significant effect of policy shock on consumer price indexes of both
United Kingdom and United States.
However as Figure 10 exhibits, for US, effect of unconventional mone-
tary policy in prices is much larger than UK in magnitude as one standard
deviation increase in unconventional monetary policy leads approximately
0.6 percentage points increase in US’s CPI while it leads approximately 0.1
percentage points increase in UK’s CPI. One possible reason for this might
be the institutional difference between US and UK as being an inflation tar-
geter, the primary mandate of UK is to preserve price stability.
On contrary, along with economic activity, unconventional monetary pol-
icy effects on consumer prices in both Japan and Brazil remains insignificant
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as well. Besides the factors have been stated in previous section, this insignif-
icance can be explained by the Japan’s idiosyncratic conditions regarding the
deflation. Because in Japan, due to the prolonged periods of deflation, stable
inflation expectations became established stable and Philips curve got flatten
while large changes in output is required in order to move inflation.
Overall, based on these results, it can be concluded that unconventional
monetary policy measures have a significant positive temporary impact on
both economic activity and prices in United States and United Kingdom.
Thus, these policies can be effectively utilized by central banks in order to
revive economic activity and avoid from the deflation trap. On the other
hand, for Japan and Brazil effects of these policy sets are not clear. Under
these specifications, unconventional monetary policies seem lacking in effec-
tiveness for these two countries.
A tentative conclusion can be drawn from these observations as they im-
ply that the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policies is subject to
cross country heterogeneity along with the differences in its design and cali-
bration across countries. Of course, as the scope of this study is limited with
the experiments of merely four countries, evidence suggested by these results
is not adequate to arrive at strong conclusions.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Financial crisis has hit the global economy by terminating the one man-
date, one policy instrument era as it has exposed Central Banks to unprece-
dented challenges. As a result, In order to handle these unprecedented chal-
lenges, central banks have embarked upon a series of unconventional policy
interventions.
In this thesis, I have analytically analyzed the post-crisis central banking
policies and investigated the effects of these unconventional measures by ex-
posing the experiences of Japan, United States, United Kingdom and Brazil.
Moreover, I have documented the heterogeneity in design and calibration of
these policies across countries and tried to investigate whether this finding
is valid for the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policies based on
the observations and results obtained from the empirical research. Firstly,
in Chapter 2, I have provided a general scope for the theoretical framework
of unconventional monetary policies and tried to put policy definitions into
a context based on the existing literature.
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In Chapter 3, I have provided a general overview about the pre-crisis
conjuncture and monetary policy regime of Japan, United States, United
Kingdom and Brazil and I have examined how these countries have initially
responded to financial crisis and how they have practiced unconventional
monetary policies in detail. Finally, I have tried to demonstrate the dif-
ferences in the implementation of unconventional monetary policies across
countries and concluded that these heterogeneities emerge from country spe-
cific objectives and discrepancies in economic and political environments of
countries such as structure of their financial systems, institutional arrange-
ments of their central banks and finally the types and origins of the shocks
that hit their economy.
Unconventional monetary policy tools have been rarely utilized in practice
and the credibility of these policy tools is not yet established. Moreover, cen-
tral banks could not anticipate the consequences of these types of measures as
they present greater uncertainty in magnitude compared with conventional
monetary policy tools. Thus, in Chapter 4, by estimating a structural vector
autoregressive model (SVAR) with monthly data over the sample period 2008
January - 2012 February, I have explored the dynamic effects of unconven-
tional monetary policy shocks on economic activity and prices. As a result,
I have empirically documented that unconventional monetary policy has a
significant positive temporary impact on both economic activity and prices
in United States and United Kingdom while in Japan, output reaction be-
comes only marginally significant after approximately twelve months as from
unconventional monetary policy shock while price response is insignificant
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and In the Brazilian case, although positive responses are estimated in both
economic activity and prices, they unfortunately remain insignificant. More-
over, based on these results, tentatively I have concluded that there exists
cross country heterogeneity in effectiveness of unconventional monetary poli-
cies along with the differences in its design and calibration across countries.
To sum up, adoption of unconventional monetary policy measures started
a new era in central banking and countries have started to pursue new ap-
proaches to overcome the negative effects of the financial crisis by bearing in
mind their own distinctive circumstances. As a result, heterogeneity in im-
plementation of unconventional monetary policies has occurred inevitably. In
this thesis, I have documented this heterogeneity and concluded that uncon-
ventional monetary policies have differentiated effectiveness across countries.
However my analysis is limited in scope as I only focused on four countries.
Further studies may extend these results by investigating country experiences
in much broader terms and increase the precise of their findings about the
effectiveness of unconventional monetary policies by adopting a counterfac-
tual analysis.
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Figure 1: Policy Rate Dynamics of Selected Countries Source: IMF Finan-
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Figure 2: Monetary Base Dynamics of Selected Countries Source: IMF Fi-
nancial Statistics (IFS)
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Figure 3: Differences in Key Macroeconomic Variables between Advanced
and Emerging Economies Source: Bloomberg, CBRT calculations. Fig.3a-
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Figure 4: GDP and Interest Rate Dynamics in Japan during the First Pe-
riod of Unconventional Monetary Policies Source: IMF Financial Statistics
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Real GDP Dynamics in Japan (1990-2006).
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Figure 5: The Relation between Monetary Base, Money Supply and Cred-
its in Japan, UK and US Sources: Bank of England, Bank of Japan and
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Figure 7: Developments in Central Bank Assets of Fed, BoJ, BoE after the
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